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[L. A. No. 22613.

v.

DuNHAM

In Bank.

[41 C.2d

Dec. 4, 1953.]

W. A. LEO, Appellant, v. RUFUS ALBERTSON DUNHAM,
Respondent.
[1] Negligence- Emergency or Sudden Peril.- A person who
without negligence on his part is suddenly and unexpectedly
confronted with peril, arising from either actual presence or
appearance of imminent danger to himself or to others, is not
expected nor required to use same judgment and prudence
that is required of him in exercise of ordinary care in calmer
and more deliberate moments.
[2] Trial-Instructions-Applicability to Pleadings and Issues.An instruction should be given only when it is applicable to
issues raised by pleadings or is pertinent to some issue or
theory developed by evidence.
[3] Negligence-Emergency or Sudden PeriL-Ordinarily, whether
a person has been suddenly confronted with imminent peril
is a question of fact to be submitted to jury.
[ 4] !d.-Anticipating Negligence.-Generally, every person has a
right to presume that every other person will perform his duty
and obey the law, and in absence of :reasonable ground to
think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that he is not
exposed to danger which comes to him only from violation of
law or duty by such other person.
[5] Automobiles-Acts in Emergencies.-A reasonably prudent person might anticipate an existent danger from approach of a
truck only 300 feet away at time he started to cross a street
and would not thereafter ignore its presence, and truck driver
therefore might reasonably expect such pedestrian to take
further care for his own safety by again looking toward approaching truck during the crossing; hence, it cannot be said,
as a matter of law, that truck driver was negligent in failing to
anticipate until truck was some 60 or SO feet from pedestrian
that pedestrian was not going to yield right of way, at which
instant truck driver may be said to have been confronted unexpectedly with a sudden and imminent peril and a deliberately
calculated and cool choice was no longer possible, thereby
affording an adequate basis for an instruction on imminent
peril.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence,§ 38; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 41.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 94; Am.Jur., Trial, § 574 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 30; [2] Trial, § 156;
[3] Negligence, § 29; [4] Negligence, § 43(3); [5] Automobiles,
§ 114.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarke E. Stephens, Judge pro tern.* Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by pedestrian in an automobile accident. Judgment for defendant
affirmed.
A. J. O'Connor and H. K. Lyle for Appellant.
Bauder, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly and Jean Wunderlich
for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-A Ford tank truck operated by Rufus
A. Dunham struck and seriously injured Willard A. Leo.
Upon his appeal from the judgment in favor of Dunham,
Leo charges that the instructions to the jury upon the doctrine
of imminent peril were prejudically erroneous.
The accident occurred when Leo walked across a highway
running north and south. On each side of the highway,
which had lanes 10 feet in width, there was a 6-foot improved
· shoulder but no curbs. As Leo started to cross from east to
west, he looked to his right and observed Dunham's truck
approaching in the far lane and about 300 feet to the north.
Upon the assumption that he had time to cross the highway,
Leo attempted to do so, and did not thereafter look in the
direction of the approaching vehicle.
In the meantime, Dunham saw Leo begin to walk across
the highway, looking in the opposite direction. Nevertheless,
Dunham continued his approach at about 35 miles per hour,
but not until he had reached a point some 60 or 80 feet
away did he conclude that a collision was imminent. He
applied his brakes, ''hollered,'' and swerved to his right. Leo
did not look around until the truck suddenly ''showed up in
front" of him. In fact, there is evidence that he walked
into the side of the truck.
The point of impact is the subject of some uncertainty.
Dunham testified that the collision occurred ''six feet west of
the westerly edge of the traveled portion of the highway."
Leo told the jury that he was in the left-hand lane of traffic
at the time he was struck. The traffic officer who investigated
the accident also placed Leo in that lane at the time of the
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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collision. According to the officer, the point of impact was
one foot east of the west line of the left lane.
The jury was given the usual instructions concerning negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause. In addition, at the request of Dunham, the rule as to the doctrine of
imminent peril was stated.
The doctrine has been variously characterized as the "sudden peril rule" (De Ponce v. Systern Freight Service, 66 Cal.
App.2d 295, 301 [152 P.2d 234] ; Uhl v. Fertig, 56 Cal.App.
718, 724 [ 206 P. 467] ) , the "imminent peril doctrine" (Stickel
v. Durfee, 88 Cal.App.2d 402, 407 [199 P.2d 16]; Yates v.
JJ1orotti, 120 Cal.App. 710,716 [8 P.2d 519] ), and the "emergency doctrine" (Rest., Torts, vol. II, Negligence [1934]
§ 296, p. 796; Prosser on Torts [1941] § 37, p. 242). [1] However, under the cases and the authorities, a person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence,
or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to
others, is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise of
ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments. (Stickel
v. Durfee, supra, pp. 407-408; Gamalia v. BadiUo, 53 Cal.App.
2d 375, 378 [128 P.2d 184] ; Graham v. Consolidated JJ1. T.
Co., 112 Cal.App. 648, 652 [297 P. 617] ; Rest., Torts, supra,
vol. II, Negligence [1934] § 296, p. 796; Prosser on Torts,
supra, [1941] § 37, p. 242; and see Bosserman v. Olmstead,
77 Cal.App.2d 236, 240 [175 P.2d 49].)
[2] An instruction should be given only when it is applicable to the issues raised by the pleadings or it is pertinent
to some issue or theory developed by the evidence. (Sills v.
Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 633 [255 P.2d 795];
Garcia v. Conrad, 40 Cal.App.2d 167, 170 [104 P.2d 527];
Arundel v. Turk, 16 Cal.App.2d 293, 297 [60 P.2d 486] .)
The decisive factor here is the time when Dunham knew, or
should have known, that an accident would occur unless preventive steps were taken. Dunham takes the position that
the evidence reasonably supports the inference that he was
suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with an emergency
when, for the first time, he realized that Leo would not keep
out of the line of the truck's travel. As he presents the facts,
it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that he had previously
been guilty of any negligence. Under such circumstances,
he says, he is entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of imminent
peril.

Dec.1953]

LEO

v.

DUNHAM

[41 C.2d 712; 264 P.2d 1]

715

Leo argues that there was nothing sudden or unexpected
about his own conduct, and Dunham's "sudden realization"
was in fact nothing more than belated awareness of an error
in judgment. Dunham's responsibility, it is argued, is determined by his conduct viewed in its entirety from the
moment he first sighted Leo and continuing until the collision.
Based upon that premise, Leo asserts, any imminent peril was
occasioned by Dunham's negligence, and the doctrine is inapplicable.
[3] Ordinarily, whether a person has been suddenly confronted with imminent peril is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. (Kehlor v. Satterlee, 37 Cal.App.2d 116,
119 [98 P.2d 759] ; and see De Ponce v. Systern Freight Service, supra, p. 3ell.) Although the evidence here justifies an
inference of negligence on the part of Dunham, it also reasonably supports the jury's implied finding that he was not negligent until the time he concluded that Leo was not going to
look around again. (Of. Varner v. Skov, 20 Cal.App.2d 232,
238 [67 P.2d 123] .) Both parties saw each other when they
were 300 feet apart. Leo was crossing a roadway at a point
not within a marked crosswalk nor within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Dunham had the right of way. (Veh.
Code, § 562 [a].) [ 4] "The general rule is that every person has a right to presume that every other person will
perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of
reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to
assume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him
only from violation of law or duty by such other person.''
(Harris v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann.Cas.
1918E 560, L.R.A. 1917C 477] ; Dickinson v. Pacific GreylWttnd Lines, 55 Cal.App.2d 824, 827 [131 P.2d 401]; and
see Folger v. Richfield Oil Gorp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655, 665 [182
P.2d 337] .) [5] Moreover, a reasonably prudent person might
well anticipate an existent danger from the approach of a
truck only 300 feet away at the time he started to cross a
street and would not thereafter ignore its presence. (Fisch.er
v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244, 249 [110 P.2d 693].) Dunham,
therefore, reasonably might have expected Leo to take :further
care for his own safety by again looking toward the approaching truck during the crossing.
For these reasons, it cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that Dunham was negligent in failing to anticipate until the
truck was some 60 to 80 feet from Leo that Leo was not
going to yield the right of way. At that instant Dunham
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reasonably may be said to have been confronted unexpectedly
with a sudden and imminent peril, and a deliberately calculated and cool choice was no longer possible. Accordingly,
the record shows adequate basis for the instruction on imminent peril.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I feel that there was no basis in the record for the instruction on imminent peril and that the giving of that instruction
constituted reversible error within the meaning of article VI,
section 41/z, of the Constitution of California.
Defendant saw the plaintiff start to cross the highway when
he was 300 feet away; he knew plaintiff was looking in the
opposite direction, but he continued his approach at the same
speed at which he had been proceeding. Not until he was
from 60 to 80 feet away from the plaintiff did he decide that
he was going to hit the plaintiff. At this time, he applied
his brakes, called out, and swerved to the right. The evidence
on the point of impact was in conflict and is, according to
the majority opinion, "the subject of some uncertainty." Defendant realized that the plaintiff was unaware of his danger
and yet he continued on his course, waiting for the plaintiff
to look in his direction and stop, until it was too late to stop
the truck. The defendant knew that the danger of the situation continued as long as the plaintiff was looking in the opposite direction and simply took the chance that plaintiff
would look and see the truck approaching. The emergency
was caused by defendant's negligence, and the doctrine has
been held not available to one in such a position (Yates v.
Marotti, 120 Cal.App. 710, 716 [8 P.2d 519] ; Dodds v. Gifford, 127 Cal.App. 629, 632 [16 P.2d 279]; 65 C.J.S., p. 412).
In Wright v. Sniffin, 80 Cal.App.2d 358 [181 P.2d 675], the
doctrine of imminent peril was held inapplicable to the conduct of a driver who voluntarily and wrongfully placed himself in a dangerous position by attempting to pass a bicycle
within 100 feet of an intersection. Defendant had seen the
child on the bicycle while he was some distance away; had
sounded his horn when he was within 200 feet of the child
who apparently did not hear the warning. The defendant
there then attempted to pass when the child veered her bicycle
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to the left and was instantly killed in the· resulting collision.
There, as here, the defendant was at all times aware of the
plaintiff's danger. There, as here, defendant assumed that
the plaintiff would realize the danger. There, as here, the
emergency was created by the defendant.
In Fraser v. Stellinger, 52 Cal.App.2d 564, 567 [126 P.2d
653], the defendant saw the plaintiff, who was riding a bicycle, abqut 1,000 feet ahead of him. \Vhen he was about
50 feet behind the plaintiff, he sounded his horn which was
not heard by the plaintiff. ·when defendant was from 2 to 5
feet to the rear of the bicycle, the plaintiff swerved his vehicle
across the path of the defendant's truck. It was there held
that the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction on
the doctrine of sudden emergency was not error because the
defendant had the rider in view for 1,000 feet as shown by
his own testimony, and that "[f]urthermore the case was
tried by the parties each claiming the accident was caused
by the negligence of the other. The jury was fully instructed
on the rules of law applicable to the respective theories of
the alleged negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff.''
In Rhodes v. Firestone l'ire etc. Co., 51 Cal.App. 569 [197
P. 392], the doctrine of sudden emergency was held inapplicable where the driver of defendant's truck had ample time
and space to avoid the collision with plaintiff's truck.
In Stealey v. Chessurn, 123 Cal.App. 446 [11 P.2d 428],
where defendant driver saw the plaintiff's decedent, a pedestrian, when she was from 6 to 10 feet ahead of him, the
appellate court held it was reversible error to give an instruction on sudden emergency without the qualification that defendant must have been free of negligence.
In Gootar v. Levin, 109 CaLApp. 703 [293 P. 706], it was
also held reversible error to give the instruction without the
qualification; in Jones v. Heinrich, 49 Cal.App.2d 702 [122
P.2d 304], the same rule was set forth.
In the present case, the pleadings put in issue the questions
of negligence and contributory negligence. There was no
evidence to support an instruction which told the jury that
" [a] person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly
and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either
the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger
to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use
the same judgment and prudence that is required of him
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in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate
moments . . . . '' (Emphasis added.) This instruction had no
place in the case, and could have had no other effect than to
confuse the jury. The majority in an endeavor to hold that
no prejudicial error was present because of the giving of the
instruction suggests that Dunham, ''therefore, reasonably
might expect Leo to take further care for his own safety by
again looking toward the approaching truck during the crossing" and concludes that "it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that Dunham was negligent in failing to anticipate until
the truck was some 60 to 80 feet from Leo that Leo was not
going to yield the right of way." The fact remains that it
cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant was not
negligent. Plaintiff's failure to watch for approaching vehicles goes to the issue of contributory negligence. In order
for the doctrine to apply to defendant's conduct, there must
have been no negligence, as a matter of law, on his part until
he was confronted with the sudden emergency. Under the
facts presented here, it cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that defendant was exercising the care of the ordinarily prudent man in assuming that plaintiff would turn and see his
vehicle approaching. And, the fact does remain that defendant was at all times aware that plaintiff was walking across
the roadway without looking in his direction. As a result,
there was no basis in the evidence of the instruction. Th:e
giving of an instruction which is unsupported by the evidence
has been held to constitute reversible error (Scandalis v. Jenny,
132 Cal.App. 307 [22 P.2d 545] ; Davenport v. Stratton, 24
Cal.2d 232 [ 149 P .2d 4] ) . The instruction on sudden emergency, under the facts of this case, was inconsistent with the
instruction on negligence as it applied to the defendant. It
is impossible to ascertain here whether the jury found that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or that defendant was
free from negligence, or that defendant was excused from
~ the consequences of his negligence because he was confronted
\ with a sudden emergency. Instructions contradictory in
. essential elements may warrant a reversal on the ground that
it cannot be ascertained which instruction was followed by
the jury (Carlson v. Shewalter, 110 Cal.App.2d 655 [243
P.2d 549] ; Rackson v. Benioff, 111 Cal.App.2d 124 [244
P.2d 9] ; Cannis v. Di Salvo Trucking Co., 111 Cal.App.2d
893 [245 P.2d 365]). Without an instruction on sudden
emergency ''a different verdict would not have been improbable" (Delzell v. Day, 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 [223 P .2d 625] ).
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I am in full accord with the views expressed in the learned
and able opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Three, prepared by Mr. Presiding
Justice Shinn when this case was before that court * (Cal.
App.) 248 P.2d 935. By unanimous decision of that court
a reversal was ordered because "the instruction [sudden
emergency] should not have been given and we have no way
of knowing that the jurors were not misled, or that the verdict
would have been the same if the instruction had not been
given. (See Wright v. Sm:.ffin, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 358,
365 [181 P.2d 675] .) "
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.

[S. F. No. 18345.

In Bank.
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'l'HE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BUILDING MAINTENANCE
CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Respondents.
[1] Monopolies-Cartwright. Act-Agreements and Combinations
Prohibited.-Agreement between some building maintenance
contractors of city whereunder they not only agree to fix
prices at which maintenance service will be provided, but also
undertake to prevent competition among themselves by forcing
their customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change
maintenance contractors, constitutes a trust as defined by
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720, relating to combinations in restraint of trade.
[2] !d.-Cartwright Act-Validity.-Provisions of Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 16723, exempting from operation of Cartwright Act
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) any agreement, combination or association, the object and purpose of which are to
conduct operations at a "reasonable profit" or to market at a
"reasonable profit" those products which cannot otherwise be
so marketed, are too vague and infect the whole statutory
standard of conduct, since there is no common-law background
or fund of common knowledge or experience that would allow
[2] See Cal.Jur., Monopolies and Combinations, § 9 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Monopolies, Combinations and Restraints of Trade,§ 16 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Monopolies,§ 6; [2, 4, 5] Monopolies,§ 5; [3] Statutes,§ 76; [7) Monopolies,§ 12; [8] Monopolies,
§ 2.
*A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on Dec. 18, 1952.

